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1INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN POLLUTION
CONTROL
Santiago J. Rubio and Begoña Casino
ABSTRACT
In this paper the pro…tability and stability of an International Environ-
mental Agreement among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are
studied using a standard quadratic net bene…t function. The static analysis
shows that only a bilateral agreement could be self-enforcing independently
of the number of countries a¤ected by the externality and the gains coming
from cooperation. It is also shown that this result occurs both when the
coalition takes as given the emissions of nonsignatories and when it acts as
the leader of the game. In the second part of the paper a di¤erential game is
proposed in order to analyze the stock externality due to accumulated emis-
sions. Similar results to the ones obtained for the static model are derived
both for an open-loop Nash equilibrium and for a feedback Nash equilibrium
in linear strategies.
KEYWORDS: International Environmental Agreements; Flow and Stock
Externalities; Di¤erential Games; Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium; Feedback
Nash Equilibrium; Linear Strategies.
21I N T R O D U C T I O N
The increasing social and political interest in global environmental problems
is only one of the aspects of the increasing interdependence among coun-
tries in recent years. Global warming, depletion of the ozone layer and loss
of biological diversity are examples of environmental problems related with
global commons that require policy coordination. The Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer and the Convention on Biodiversity are the most impor-
tant International Environmental Agreements (IEA) signed to date. There
are two main issues related to international environmental cooperation: the
pro…tability and the stability of the agreements. The pro…tability refers to
the potential gains coming from the cooperation among countries when re-
ciprocal negative externalities exist. The question regarding the stability of
an agreement arises due to the absence of an international authority or an
international law that compels countries to take part in or respect the agree-
ment. Thus, countries may face a prisoner’s dilemma whereby, although
there are greater bene…ts to be gained through full cooperation, each one has
incentives to unilaterally defect from the agreement.1
Di¤erent papers have been published in recent years on these issues.
Among them we would like to highlight the ones written by Heal (1992),
Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994, 1997b), Sandler
and Sargent (1995) and Na and Shin (1998). In all these papers a nonco-
operative game-theory analysis of coalition formation among two or more
countries is presented assuming that environmental damages are associated
with ‡ow externalities and that all the players move only once.2 From these
papers we are interested in the results obtained by Hoel (1992) and Bar-
rett (1994). In these two papers the number of signatories, the terms of the
self-enforcing agreement and the actions of nonsignatories are all determined
endogenously using numerical examples. Hoel …nds for a model of constant
marginal environmental cost that only two countries cooperate in equilibrium
1Good surveys on global environmental problems and international environmental
agreements are Barrett (1997a), Carraro and Siniscalco (1998), Swanson and Johnston
(1999) and Finus (2000).
2For a cooperative approach see Chander and Tulkens (1992, 1997) and van Egteren
and Tang (1997). In Barrett (1994) and Finus and Rundshagen (1998) the stability of the
agreement is studied in the framework of an in…nitely repeated game applying the concept
of renegotiation-proofness.
3almost independently of the total number of countries, and that this equilib-
rium is for all practical purposes equal to the noncooperative equilibrium. In
his model it is assumed that the agreement among countries with a di¤erent
marginal environmental cost consists of a uniform percentage reduction of
their emissions which is determined by the most preferred reduction for the
median country (among the signatories countries).3 In Barrett (1994) it is
assumed that all the countries are identical and that the signatories act as
the leader of the game, i.e. they choose their level of abatement to maximize
their collective net bene…ts subject to the reaction functions of nonsignato-
ries. His results show for the case of linear marginal abatement bene…ts and
costs that, when cooperation can increase net bene…ts substantially, the self-
enforcing IEA cannot sustain a large number of signatories. However, when
the gains from cooperation are low, a lot of countries would be interested in
signing the agreement. Finally, we want to mention that the pro…tability of
the cooperation among countries su¤ering a negative stock externality has
been analyzed by Long (1992), van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992), Dockner
and Long (1993), Xepapadeas (1995) and Dockner and Nishimura (1999).4
In these papers, the interdependence among countries is modeled as a dif-
ferential game or as a di¤erence game, and the noncooperative outcome as
a feedback Nash equilibrium. The study developed by these authors focuses
on the comparison between the e¢cient solution and the noncooperative so-
lution of the game but does not address the analysis of the stability of the
agreements.5
Our paper has two parts. In the …rst part, we present a full character-
ization of the self-enforcing agreement obtained analytically for a model of
3Petrakis and Xepapapadeas (1996) extends, using also a model with constant marginal
environmental cost, Carraro and Siniscalco’s (1993) results to the case in which the par-
ticipating countries are not identical. They show that if a group of countries commits to
cooperation, there exists a system of self-…nanced side payments, such that the rest of
countries involved in the environmental externality enter the coalition and reduce emis-
sions.
4See Kaitala, Pohjola and Tahvonen (1992), Tahvonen (1994), Escapa and Gutiérrez
(1997) and Mäler and de Zeeuw (1998) for simulations, in a dynamic framework, on how the
potential gains derived from cooperation would be distributed among countries. Tahvonen
(1994) and Escapa and Gutiérrez (1997) focus on the global warming problem whereas
Kaitala, Pohjola and Tahvonen (1992) and Mäler and de Zeeuw (1998) address the acid
rain problem.
5In Dockner and Nishimura (1999) the dynamics of the feedback Nash equilibrium for
the case of one-sided transboundary pollution is analyzed.
4emission control with a standard quadratic net bene…t function and identical
countries. We also study the importance of the equilibrium concept used
to solve the game considering, …rstly, that the signatories take as given the
emissions of the nonsignatories countries, and, secondly, that the coalition
of signatories behaves as a leader. Our results show that in both cases the
unique self-enforcing IEA consists only of two countries independently of the
scope of the gains and the number of the countries involved in the externality.
This result generalizes for a model with linear marginal environmental costs
the …ndings obtained by Hoel (1992). Moreover, our analysis shows that
the model of emissions used in our paper is not completely symmetric to
the model of abatement developed by Barrett as long as we obtain di¤erent
conclusions.6 We …nd that the net bene…ts of signatories and nonsignatories
increase with cooperation. However, the incentive for a country to act as a
free rider is big enough as if to prevent cooperation once a coalition of two
countries has been reached. In the second part of the paper we extend the
analysis of the agreement stability to the case of a stock externality, thus
advancing the analysis developed in the papers just quoted. Following van
der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) and Dockner and Long (1993), we develop an
international pollution control model with N identical countries where the
interactions between signatory and nonsignatory countries are represented
by a di¤erential game. In a …rst approximation of the problem of stability
using open-loop strategies, we …nd that, for any size of coalition, countries
get smaller payo¤s if they cooperate. A numerical example con…rms that,
in a dynamic framework, the scope of the agreement is also limited. Our
results show that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA in-
dependently of the gains coming from cooperation. In the last part of the
paper, we calculate the feedback Nash equilibrium in linear strategies for the
same numerical example and we …nd again the same result. The sensitivity
analysis shows that this result is robust. The intuition is that agents do not
…nd it pro…table to select punishment strategies if these are not credible. In
other words, if they have a negative e¤ect on their own payo¤s higher than
the negative e¤ect of accommodating to the exit of one of the countries in
6The di¤erence in the results is explained by the di¤erent modelling of the environ-
mental externalities. Thus, whereas Barrett uses a model of abatement where the interde-
pendence among countries occurs through the bene…t function, we work with a model of
emissions where the interdependence passes through the environmental damage function
and this di¤erence is relevant in the analysis of the stability of the agreements as our
results show.
5the agreement. Then, given that the incentive to act as a free rider is su¢-
ciently large and that the payo¤s of the signatories increase with respect to
the number of countries belonging to the agreement, the result is that only
a bilateral agreement can be self-enforcing.
In Section 2 the static model is presented and the e¢cient equilibrium and
the Cournot equilibrium are calculated. In Section 3 the stability analysis
is developed, assuming …rstly, Subsection 3.1, that the signatories countries
take as given the emissions of the nonsignatory countries, to study, secondly,
Subsection 3.2, the Stackelberg equilibrium. The dynamic model is studied
in Section 4. In this Section the e¢cient equilibrium, the open-loop Nash
equilibrium and the feedback Nash equilibrium are calculated and compared.
In Section 5 the stability of an IEA is analyzed using a numerical example
both for an open-loop Nash equilibrium, Subsection 5.2, and for a feedback
Nash equilibrium, Subsection 5.4. Some concluding remarks end the paper.
2T H E S T A T I C M O D E L
A pollutant is emitted by N identical countries that share a natural resource
as the environment. De…ne qi as emissions by country i.T h e s ee m i s s i o n sa r e
associated with some natural resource, say oil, whose consumption provides,
directly or indirectly, some utility. Therefore, each country gets some bene…ts
from its emissions and su¤ers a damage due to aggregate emissions, Q = P
i qi.






i, a>0, b>0,( 1 )





2, c>0,( 2 )
and denote country i ¶ s net bene…ts by










62.1 Full-cooperation versus non-cooperation
The gains coming from full-cooperation will be given by the di¤erence be-
tween net bene…ts under cooperation and net bene…ts got by countries when
they do not cooperate. The level of emissions that maximizes aggregate net
bene…ts ¦=
P
i ¼i is found by setting each country’s marginal bene…ts of
emissions equal to global marginal costs. Thus the full cooperative level of
emissions, q¤
i, and net bene…ts, ¼¤












The noncooperative outcome arises when each country chooses its level of
emissions taking as given the level of emissions from all the other countries.
The optimal solution consists of setting each country’s marginal bene…t of
emissions equal to its own marginal cost. This Cournot equilibrium is given
by the following level of emissions, qc










a2 [b ¡ (N ¡ 2)Nc]
2(b + Nc)
2 : (4)
Since we are analyzing a model of partial equilibrium, it is possible to
…nd some substitute for the resource so that this will be exploited only if net
bene…ts are strictly positive. This occurs when b=c > N(N ¡ 2).T h a t i s ,
when the rate of decrease of marginal bene…ts relative to the rate of increase
of marginal costs is enough large. We assume in the rest of the paper that
this inequality is satis…ed.










(b=c + N2)[b=c ¡ (N ¡ 2)N]
:
Thus, full-cooperation is more pro…table when b=c takes a small value and
we can state the following:
Proposition 1 The gains to cooperation depend positively on the slope of
the marginal cost function and negatively on (the absolute value of) the slope
of the marginal bene…t function.
7Nevertheless, the optimality of full-cooperation is not enough to guaran-
tee a stable coalition including the N countries because each one may have
incentives to unilaterally defect from the agreement. For this reason, it is
also necessary to study the stability of a coalition.
3 STABILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIROMENTAL AGRREMENT
Suppose that n countries negotiate an IEA and the other N ¡ n countries
decide to be outside the coalition. The number of signatories that sustains a
stable agreement will be obtained by using the concept of stability developed
by d’Aspremont et al. (1983) for the analysis of a cartel. This stability
concept has already been used by Hoel (1992) and Barrett (1994) to analyze
the self-enforcement of an IEA. Let ¼j be net bene…ts of a country j that
does not belong to the coalition of countries that sign the IEA and ¼i net
bene…ts of a signatory country. According to Barrett (1994) a self-enforcing
agreement can be de…ned as follows.
De…nition 1 An IEA consisting of n signatories is self-enforcing if ¼i(n) ¸
¼j (n ¡ 1) and ¼j (n) ¸ ¼i (n +1 ) ,w h e r ei =1 ;:::;n and j =1 ;:::;N ¡ n:
The …rst inequality holds if signatory countries have no incentives to with-
draw from the coalition because the increase in the costs due to the increase
in aggregate emissions would be higher than the bene…t provided by an in-
crease in their emissions. The second inequality requires that nonsignatories
do not want to accede to the coalition because the decrease in the costs due
to a reduction in aggregate emissions would be smaller than the decrease in
their bene…ts resulting from the reduction of their emissions.
Net bene…ts of a nonsignatory country j are given by the following ex-
pression

















The level of emissions for which marginal bene…ts are equal to marginal
costs provides the maximum bene…t of each country j. Under the assumption
of symmetry this condition is:
8a ¡ bqj = c[nqi +( N ¡ n)qj];j =1 ;:::;N ¡ n: (5)
This equation implicitly de…nes the reaction function for the N ¡n countries
that are outside the coalition. Thus, the optimal level of qj depends on
emissions by signatories.
3.1 Cournot conjecture
Signatories are assumed to coordinate for the same level of emissions in order
to maximize their collective net bene…ts taking as given the emissions of
nonsignatories. Then, the reaction functions of countries belonging to the
coalition are given by the following expression
a ¡ bqi = nc[nqi +( N ¡ n)qj];i =1 ;:::;n: (6)
The intersection between the two best replay functions de…ned by Eqs.




a[b ¡ (N ¡ n)(n ¡ 1)c]
b[b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c]




a[b + n(n ¡ 1)c]
b[b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c]
, j =1 ;:::;N ¡ n; (8)




b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c
: (9)
It is easy to verify that the full cooperative (n = N) and noncooperative
solutions (n =0or n =1 ) ,g i v e nb yE q s . (3) and (4), are special cases of
Eqs. (7) and (8).
Notice that qc
i could take negative values. However, it is immediate to
check that for b=c > N(N ¡ 2) the expression (7) is positive for all n 2
9[2;N¡1].7 Moreover, aggregate emissions decrease as the size of the coalition
increases and, if we take the derivative of the expressions (7) and (8) with












[(n2 ¡ N)c ¡ b]Nca
b[b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c]
2:
Thus, emissions by nonsignatory countries increase with the size of the coali-
tion and the condition b=c > N(N ¡ 2) guarantees that emissions by signa-
tories decrease.8







b[b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c]
< 0 for all n ¸ 2:
Therefore, signatory countries emit less pollutants than nonsignatories. Since
the bene…t and cost functions are identical for both types of countries and the
costs depend on aggregate emissions, a country that emits more than other
has higher net bene…ts. Consequently, we can conclude that ¼c
i(n) <¼ c
j(n)
for n 2 [2;N¡ 1]. Moreover, it is easy to show that both net bene…ts are
increasing with respect to the number of signatories. Using (7) and (8) we







N2ca2 (b + n2c)
2b[b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c]
2; (10)
7The optimal level of emissions of signatories is positive for b=c > (N ¡ n)(n ¡ 1) but
as N(N¡2) > (N ¡ n)(n ¡ 1) for n 2 [2;N¡1], we have that, if the condition for positive
net bene…ts, b=c > N(N ¡ 2), is satis…ed, b=c > (N ¡ n)(n ¡ 1) is also satis…ed and qc
i is
positive.
8The partial derivative @qc
i=@n is negative for b=c > n2 ¡ N: From
b=c > (N ¡ 2)N we have that (n2 ¡ N) ¡ b=c < (n2 ¡ N) ¡ (N ¡ 2)N
= n2¡N(N¡1): This expression increases with n and takes a negative value for n = N¡1:
Consequently, (n2 ¡ N) ¡ b=c < 0 for all n 2 [2;N¡ 1],a n d@qc








N2ca2 (b + c)
2b[b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c]
2: (11)
It is immediate from this last expression that the net bene…ts of nonsigna-
tories increase as the number of countries that sign the agreement increases.





4a2c2bN2 [b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c][cn(N ¡ n2) ¡ b(n ¡ 1)]
4b2 [b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c]
4
where cn(N ¡n2)¡b(n¡1) is negative if b=c > N(N ¡ 2): In this case, the
net bene…ts of signatories also increase with the number of countries in the
agreement.
However, as our de…nition of stability depends on the comparison between
¼c
i(n) and ¼c
j(n ¡ 1),w es t a r ta tn =2comparing ¼c
i(2) with ¼c
j(1) in order







N2c2a2 [b2 ¡ 2(N ¡ 4)bc ¡ (3N2 ¡ 4N ¡ 4)c2]
2b[b +( N +2 )c]
2 [b + Nc]
2 :
T h es i g no ft h i sd i ¤ e r e n c ed e p e n d so nt h es i g no ft h ee x p r e s s i o ni n t o
square brackets in the numerator. It is easy to show that this expression
is positive for b=c > N(N ¡ 2) so that we can conclude that ¼c
i(2) >¼ c
j(1)
for this case.9 T h i sm e a n st h a ta tl e a s tt w oc o u n t r i e sc o u l di m p r o v eb y
cooperating. Now, according to our de…nition of stability, we have to check
if there are incentives for a nonsignatory country to cooperate with this
coalition. Thus, if we compare ¼c
j(2) with ¼c






4N2c3a2 [(N ¡ 1)b + N (N +3 )c]
b[b +( N +2 )c]
2 [b +( N +6 )c]
2 > 0.
9The expression into square brackets is positive for b=c > N ¡4+2
¡
N2 ¡ 3N +3
¢1=2.
Let’s suppose that N(N¡2) <N¡4+2
¡
N2 ¡ 3N +3
¢1=2 which implies that N2¡3N+4 <
2
¡
N2 ¡ 3N +3
¢1=2. Then the square on the left-hand side must be smaller than the square
on the right-hand side which yields the following contradiction: N2 (N ¡ 3)
2 +4 N(N ¡
3)+4 < 0 for N ¸ 2; a n dw ec a nw r i t et h a tb=c > N(N¡2) >N¡4+2
¡
N2 ¡ 3N +3
¢1=2
and conclude that the expression into brackets is positive.
11Therefore, a bilateral coalition satis…es the stability condition stated in




i(3).O n t h e c o n t r a r y , a
coalition of three countries violates the inequality ¼c
i (n) ¸ ¼c
j (n ¡ 1):
In general, from Eqs. (10) and (11) we can get the di¤erence between
¼c
j (n ¡ 1) and ¼c
i (n) for any size of the coalition as
¼
c
j (n ¡ 1) ¡ ¼
c
i (n)=
(n ¡ 1)N2c2a2 [(n ¡ 3)b2 + Abc + Bc2]
2b[b +( N +( n ¡ 1)(n ¡ 2))c]




(n ¡ 1)N + n
3 ¡ 4n
2 +3 n ¡ 2
¤
;




2 ¡ 2n ¡ 1
¢
N + n
2 (n ¡ 1)
2 (n ¡ 3);
where A and B are positive for n ¸ 3.T h u s ,i fw es t a r ta tn = N we …nd
that the incentives to form a coalition arise only for n =2 . Therefore, we
can conclude the following:
Proposition 2 A Cournot-IEA consisting of two countries is the unique
self-enforcing IEA, independently of the scope of the gains to full-cooperation
and the number of countries.
This results can be better understood by considering an example. Ta-
ble 1 shows the net bene…t and emissions corresponding to each possible
agreement, and Fig. 1 illustrates the example.
To solve for n¤,s t a r ta tn =1and compare ¼j(1) with ¼i(2): Clearly, 3306
< 3418, and hence it will play a nonsignatory to enter into the agreement.
Now compare ¼j(2) with ¼i(3): In this case, 3897 > 3799, and it will not pay
a nonsignatory to cooperate. Likewise, starting at n =1 0 ; one …nds that
signatories always do better by withdrawing from the agreement whenever
n>2: Hence, a bilateral agreement is the only self-enforcing IEA. In Fig. 1
we represent the net bene…ts obtained by a country that belongs to a coalition
of size n; ¼c
i(n) and the net bene…ts that the country could get by leaving
the coalition, ¼c
j(n ¡ 1): These two functions intersect each other between
n =2and n =3 ; so that a nonsignatory has no incentives to join a bilateral
coalition. Similarly, starting at n =1 0 ; signatories have an strong incentive
to unilaterally defect from the great coalition and this happens for every
coalition greater than two.
12Table 1: Stability analysis for the numerical example. Static
model.*
n    i q    j q         Q             i π            j π         Π
1 36.3636 363.636 3306 33060
2 32.8571 36.4286 357.143 3418 3897 38012
3 29.6552 36.5517 344.828 3799 4988 46313
4 26.8852 36.7213 327.869 4413 6428 56220
5 24.6154 36.9231 307.692 5207 8047 66270
6 22.8571 37.1429 285.714 6122 9694 75508
7 21.5789 37.3684 263.158 7102 11257 83485
8 20.7229 37.5904 240.964 8097 12669 90114
9 20.2198 37.8022 219.780 9071 13902 95541
10 20.0000 200.000 10000 100000
*Assumes N=10, a=1000, b=25 and c=0.25
The agreement involving two countries only causes a small reduction in
aggregate emissions of about a 1.8 % and an increase in aggregate net bene…ts
of 15 %. These gains are small regarding the gains to full cooperation that
represents a 202.5%. In other words, this equilibrium is for all practical
purposes almost identical to the noncooperative equilibrium.
Next, in order to see the implications of the concept of equilibrium used
to solve the game, we analyze the Stackelberg equilibrium.










N=10, a=1000, b=25 and c=0.25
Serie 1: ¼i(n) ´net bene…ts of signatory countries for a coalition of size n.
Serie 2: ¼j (n ¡ 1) ´net bene…ts of nonsignatory countries for a coalition of
size n-1.
143.2 Leadership
Let’s now assume that the coalition acts as a leader. From (5) we get the
reaction function of nonsignatories
qj =
a ¡ ncqi
b +( N ¡ n)c
: (12)
The countries that belong to the coalition choose qi to maximize their






(b +( N ¡ n)c)





(b +( N ¡ n)c)
2 + n2bc
¤ ;i =1 ;:::;n: (13)




[(b ¡ nc)(b +( N ¡ n)c)+n2bc]a
b
£
(b +( N ¡ n)c)
2 + n2bc
¤ ;j=1 ;:::;N ¡ n: (14)
Accordingly, aggregated emissions are
Q
s =
[b +( N ¡ n)c]Na
(b +( N ¡ n)c)
2 + n2bc
:
Notice that the noncooperative Stackelberg equilibrium is given by Eqs.
(13) and (14) for n =1and the noncooperative Cournot equilibrium by Eq.
(14) for n =0 .
It is also possible to prove (see Appendix A) that, as happened under
Cournot conjecture, if the condition for positive net bene…ts is satis…ed,
emissions by signatory countries decrease with the size of the coalition while






n2 (b + c)c ¡ (b + Nc)
2¤
Nca













(b +( N ¡ n)c)
2 + n2bc
¤ > 0: (16)
The e¤ect on aggregate emissions is given by the following expression that









(b +( N ¡ n)c)
2 + n2bc
¤2 < 0:
That is, the increase of emissions by nonsignatory countries is compensated
by the decrease of emissions by signatories. If we compare the emissions of






[(N ¡ n)c ¡ (n ¡ 1)b]Nca
b
£
(b +( N ¡ n)c)
2 + n2bc
¤:
>From this di¤erence a critical value for n is obtained: n+ =( N + b=c)=
(1 + b=c),s ot h a ti fn<n + then qs
j <q s
i and consequently ¼s
j(n) <¼ s
i(n) and




i(n). Thus, if condition b=c > N(N¡2)
is satis…ed, n+ presents an upper bound equal to N=(N ¡ 1): As this value
is lower than two, we have that 1 <n + < 2 for any value of b=c higher than
(N ¡2)N,a n dt h e n¼s
i (1) >¼ s
j (1) whereas ¼s
i (n) <¼ s
j (n) for n ¸ 2.U s i n g























(b +( N ¡ n)c)
2 + n2bc
¤2 ;
which, as it occurred under Cournot conjecture, are increasing with respect
to the number of countries that join in the agreement.11
10Notice that the numerator in @Qs=@n is equal to the numerator in (16).
11Again the only condition we need to obtain this result is that b=c > N(N ¡ 2):
16Next, we investigate whether the unique self-enforcing IEA is also, for the
leadership case, a coalition consisting of two countries. For n =2 ; we get
¼
s
i (2) ¡ ¼
s
j (1) =
N2a2[b4c2 +2 Nb3c3 + Cb2c4 + Dbc5 + Ec6]
2b
£
(b +( N ¡ 1)c)
2 + bc
¤2 £





2 ¡ 1;D´ (N ¡ 1)(2N
2 ¡ 5N +5 ) ;
E ´ (N ¡ 2)
2(N ¡ 1)
2:
This di¤erence takes positive values for N ¸ 2. This means that a country
that cooperates with another country has no incentives to exit from the
coalition. To check if a bilateral coalition is stable we also have to prove
whether a third country has incentives to join the coalition and increase its
size to three. Then, for n =3we have
¼
s
j (2) ¡ ¼
s
i (3) =
N2a2 [8b3c3 ¡ Fb2c4 ¡ Gbc5 ¡ Hc6]
2b
£
(b +( N ¡ 2)c)
2 +4 bc
¤2 £






2 +1 0 N ¡ 23
¢
;G ´ 2(N ¡ 2)(N ¡ 1)
2 ;
H ´ (N ¡ 3)
2 (N ¡ 2)
2 ;
where the term into square brackets in the numerator can be written as
a function of ° ´ b=c : c6 [8°3 ¡ F°2 ¡ G° ¡ H]: It is easy to prove that
this function decreases …rst until reaching a minimum and then it becomes
increasing and convex. It is also easy to show that for ° = N(N ¡ 2) the
value of this function is positive, so that, if the condition b=c > N(N ¡ 2) is
satis…ed, the function of ° into square brackets in the numerator of (17) is
positive and, consequently, ¼s
j (2) >¼ s
i (3). Therefore, an IEA consisting of
two countries satis…es the stability condition established in De…nition 1.
In Fig. 2, built from the numerical example of the previous section, we
can see that starting from the great coalition, each country has incentives to
exit from the agreement and this happens for any size of the coalition larger
than two. Then we can conclude the following:
17Proposition 3 A Stackelberg-IEA consisting of two countries is the unique
self-enforcing IEA, independently of the scope of the gains to full-cooperation
and the number of countries.
Again we …nd that a bilateral agreement causes a small reduction in
aggregate emissions of 1.6% and a small increase in aggregate net bene…ts
of 13.7% taking into account that full-cooperation represents an increase of
204.57% in net bene…ts. The countries belonging to the coalition are slightly
better o¤ than in the Cournot equilibrium since their net bene…ts are higher
in a 0.1%.
Finally, we compare the two stable agreements obtained in this section.
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2 +4 bc
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> 0; for N>2;
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(b +( N ¡ 2)c)
2 +4 bc
¤
[b +( N +2 )c]
> 0 for N>2:
Thus, we can conclude the following:
Proposition 4 Emissions by signatories are greater under leadership than
under Cournot conjecture. Emissions by nonsignatories are smaller when
they are followers. Aggregate emissions are greater in the Stackelberg equi-
librium than in the Cournot equilibrium.
It is clear from the above results that the net bene…ts of nonsignatory
countries are greater in the Cournot equilibrium because these countries emit
more whereas aggregate emissions and, consequently costs, are smaller than










(b +( N ¡ 2)c)
2 +4 bc
¤
[b +( N +2 )c]
2 > 0; for N>2
and, then, we can state:
Proposition 5 The net bene…ts of signatories are greater in the Stackelberg
equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium.
Although signatory countries face greater costs in the Stackelberg equilib-
rium than in the Cournot equilibrium, they obtain greater bene…ts because
they emit more so that the total e¤ect is an increase in net bene…ts. Thus,
leadership favors to the countries that cooperate but generates a higher level
of aggregate emissions and, consequently, a smaller level of environmental
quality.







Serie1 3307 3422 3804 4419 5213 6127 7104 8099 9072 10000
Serie2 3306 3281 3811 4835 6225 7825 9487 11090 12558 13847
123456789 1 0
N=10, a=1000, b=25 and c=0.25
Serie 1: ¼i(n) ´net bene…ts of signatory countries for a coalition of size n.
Serie 2: ¼j (n ¡ 1) ´net bene…ts of nonsignatory countries for a coalition of
size n-1.
204 THE DYNAMIC MODEL
The main di¤erence regarding the static model is that now the damage func-

















Moreover, for a positive rate of natural decay k, the dynamic of accumu-





qi ¡ kz: (19)
4.1 Full-cooperation
The cooperative outcome arises if all countries choose a level of emissions
such that aggregate net bene…ts are maximized. Then, the coalition faces























z = Nqi ¡ kz; z(0) = z0 ¸ 0; (20)
where ± is the discount rate. We implicitly assume the non-negativity con-
straint on the control variables and we do not impose z ¸ 0 as a state
constraint but as a terminal condition, limt!1 z ¸ 0; for simplicity.














+ ¸(Nqi ¡ kz);
21the necessary conditions for an interior solution are
a ¡ bqi + ¸ =0 ; (21)
:
¸ =( ± + k)¸ + Ncz; (22)




¡±t¸ ¸ 0; lim
t!1
e
¡±t¸z =0 : (23)
The condition (21) establishes that the marginal bene…t of emissions must
be equal to the marginal user cost, ¸. Using this condition to eliminate
the marginal user cost from the Euler equation, we obtain the following
di¤erential equation for emissions
:






that together with the dynamic constraint of accumulated emissions allows
us to obtain the optimal path of the variables of the problem if the transver-










k (± + k)a




N (± + k)a
k (± + k)b + N2c
: (24)
Now, in order to determine the stability features of the steady state we ex-
amine the characteristic roots of the system and obtain that the determinant


















22This implies that the two roots have opposite signs, which establishes that
the steady state of the system is a saddle point. For these types of critical
points there are two stable branches in the phase diagram and there exists
an optimal path to reach the steady state as illustrated in Fig. 3.


























b [k (± + k)b + N2c]
i
< 0:
All this can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 For the optimal control problem (20) : i) There exists a
unique steady state given by (24) and the optimal path de…ned by (25) leads
to the steady state. ii) The steady state is a saddle point equilibrium and the
optimal path approaches it asymptotically. iii) Initial emissions are higher
than the steady-state emissions and emissions are decreasing along the opti-
mal path.





































It is easy to prove that K is negative which implies that the second term
on the right-hand side in (26) is positive so that if the steady-state net
bene…ts are positive, then, W ¤
i is also positive. However, this condition is
not necessary for getting a positive present value.













Figure 3: Phase diagram of the cooperative solution.
.
.4.2 Open-loop Nash equilibrium
When countries do not cooperate they choose the level of emissions that


























qj ¡ kz; z(0) = z0 ¸ 0; (27)
so that the noncooperative equilibrium is the solution of the di¤erential game
de…ned by (27) for i =1 ;:::;N.
In this section we compute the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game.
For the open-loop Nash equilibrium, countries commit themselves at the
moment of starting to an entire temporal path of emissions that maximizes
the present value of their stream of net bene…ts given the emission path of
the rival countries. Then for every given path qj of country j, j =1 ;:::;N ¡1
country i faces the problem of maximizing (27).T h eo t h e rc o u n t r i e sj face
a similar problem. An equilibrium of the game are N open-loop strategies
that solve the N optimization problems simultaneously. De…ning the current
value Hamiltonian in the standard way,
















The necessary conditions for an interior open-loop equilibrium are
a ¡ bqi + ¸i =0 ;i=1 ;:::;N; (28)
:
¸i =( ± + k)¸i + cz;i =1 ;:::;N; (29)




¡±t¸i ¸ 0; lim
t!1
e
¡±t¸iz =0 : (30)
The condition (28) establishes that the marginal bene…t of emissions must
be equal to the private marginal user cost, ¸i. This cost evolves according
to the Euler equation (29). If we compare the Euler equations (22) and (29),
we realize that the di¤erence between them is given by (N ¡ 1)cz which rep-
resents the social cost of a marginal increment in accumulated emissions. In
the noncooperative equilibrium, countries do not take this cost into account.
Note that this cost varies directly with the number of countries.
Assuming symmetric countries simpli…es the solution. With symmetry,
qi = qj and ¸i = ¸j and, therefore, the 2N equations de…ned by (28) and (29)
reduces to 2. Then, using the condition (28) to eliminate the marginal user
cost from (29), we obtain the following di¤erential equation for emissions
:






that together with the dynamic constraint of accumulated emissions allows










k (± + k)a




N (± + k)a
k (± + k)b + Nc
: (31)
Furthermore, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the system of
















This implies that the steady state of the system is a saddle point and that
there exists an optimal path which leads to the steady state. The phase
diagram is similar to the one of the cooperative solution, see Fig. 3. However,
14Where ol stands for open-loop Nash equilibrium.
26for the noncooperative solution the
:
qi =0l o c u si sa b o v et h e
:
qi =0locus
corresponding to the cooperative solution except for z =0resulting in a
steady-state equilibrium where both emissions and accumulated emissions
are higher than in the cooperative equilibrium.





























b [k (± + k)b + Nc]
i
< 0:
All this can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 For the di¤erential game de…ned by (27) for i =1 ;:::;N :
i) There exists a unique steady state given by (31) and the optimal path
de…ned by (32) leads to the steady state. ii) The steady state is a saddle point
equilibrium and the optimal path approaches it asymptotically. iii) Initial
emissions are higher than steady-state emissions and emissions are decreasing
along the optimal path.
Finally, we can calculate the discounted present value of the ‡ow of net
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¢
(± + k)




rol ¡ ± ¡ k
¢2
2(2rol ¡ ±)(rol ¡ ± ¡ k)
:
The second term on the right-hand side of (33) is positive as happened in
the cooperative solution.
To end this subsection we compare the two solutions. We have already
established that the cooperative solution is characterized by a lower steady-
state stock of pollution and a lower level of emissions. Next, we compare the























































ol (t) and as z¤ (0) = zol (0) = z0 =0we obtain that z¤ (t) <z ol (t)
for all t 2 (0;1). In order to compare the time paths of emissions we use the





























since zol (t) ¸ z¤ (t), for all t 2 [0;1), which implies that qol
i (t) >q ¤
i (t) for
all t 2 [0;1). Consequently, we can write the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Both emissions and accumulated emissions for the open-loop
Nash equilibrium are higher than for the cooperative equilibrium for all t 2
(0;1). Moreover, initial emissions for the noncooperative solution are higher
than for the cooperative solution.
Finally, we would want to point out that the di¤erence between the coop-
erative and the noncooperative outcome decreases with respect to b=c: If we









(b=c)k(± + k)+N2; (35)
whose absolute value negatively depends on b=c: This result establishes that
an increase in the environmental damages results in an increase in the inef-
…ciency of the noncooperative solution, as was to be expected.
4.3 Feedback Nash equilibrium
A feedback strategy consists of a contingency plan that indicates the optimal
value of the control variable for each value of the state variable at each
point in time. Thus, feedback strategies have the property of being subgame
perfect because after each player’s actions have caused the state of the system
to evolve from its initial state to a new state, the continuation of the game
may be regarded as a subgame of the original game. Therefore, a feedback
strategy must satisfy the principle of optimality of dynamic programming





















where Wi (z) stands for the optimal control value function associated with the
optimization problem (27), i.e. it denotes the maximum discounted present
value of the ‡ow of net bene…ts subject to the dynamic constraint of accu-
mulated emissions for the current value of the state variable, and W 0
i is its
…rst derivative.
>From the …rst order condition for the maximization of the right-hand
side of the Bellman equation, we get
a ¡ bqi + W
0
i =0 , i =1 ;:::;N (37)
This condition is equivalent to the one obtained for the open-loop Nash
equilibrium and can be given the same interpretation. See (28). However,
now this condition de…nes the optimal strategy for emissions as a function
of accumulated emissions: qi =( a + W 0
i (z))=b. Next, by incorporating this
29optimal strategy into the Bellman equation, we eliminate the maximization





















In order to derive the solution to this equation, we guess a quadratic





2 + ¯iz + ¹i:










®i ¡ bc =0 (39)
Na®i +[ ( 2 N ¡ 1)®i ¡ b(k + ±)]¯i =0 (40)
(a + ¯i)[a +( 2 N ¡ 1)¯i] ¡ 2b±¹i =0 (41)



























[a +( 2 N ¡ 1)¯i]: (44)





(a + ¯i + ®iz);i =1 ;:::;N (45)













which can be used to calculate the optimal path of the feedback Nash equi-
librium. The particular solution
:
z =0yields the steady state for the state





N [b(k + ±) ¡ (N ¡ 1)®i]a





k [b(k + ±) ¡ (N ¡ 1)®i]a
b[k(b(k + ±) ¡ (N ¡ 1)®i)+Nc]
: (48)
Next, using the stability condition for (46) we select one of the two solu-














The negative root of (42) satis…es this condition but not the positive root.
Using this negative root we can check that a + ¯i in (45) is positive
a + ¯i =
[b(k + ±) ¡ (N ¡ 1)®i]a
b(k + ±) ¡ (2N ¡ 1)®i
;
and can conclude that the linear strategy (45) de…nes a negative relationship
between current and accumulated emissions.
Now, solving the di¤erential equation (46) and using (45) we obtain the






















15Where f stands for the feedback Nash equilibrium. We have used (39) in order to
simplify the …nal expression.












All this can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 9 For the di¤erential game de…ned by (27) for i =1 ;:::;N:
i) There exists a unique linear equilibrium strategy given by (45). ii) The
steady state de…ned by (47) and (48) is unique and the optimal path given
by (49) approaches it asymptotically. iii) The steady state is globally stable.
iv) Initial emissions are higher than steady-sate emissions and emissions are
decreasing along the optimal path.
For the feedback Nash equilibrium, the discounted present value of the
net bene…ts stream, if we assume that z0 =0 ,i sd i r e c t l yg i v e nb y¹i that
c a nb ew r i t t e ni nt e r m so f®i
W
f
i = ¹i =
[b(k + ±) ¡ (N ¡ 1)®i][b(k + ±)+( 2 N ¡ 1)(N ¡ 1)®i]a2
2±b[b(k + ±) ¡ (2N ¡ 1)®i]
2 :
To end this section we compare the two noncooperative solutions. We
prove in Appendix C the following proposition:
Proposition 10 Both emissions and accumulated emissions for the feedback
Nash equilibrium in linear strategies are higher than for the open-loop Nash
equilibrium for all t 2 (0;1). Moreover, initial emissions for the feedback
Nash equilibrium are higher than for the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
This result establishes that the noncooperative outcome is less e¢cient for
the feedback Nash equilibrium than for the open-loop Nash equilibrium. This
bias of the feedback Nash equilibrium in linear strategies also appears in the
papers written by van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) and Mäler and de Zeeuw
(1998) and has been obtained in other applications of di¤erential games,
see, for instance, Rubio and Casino (2001) and the literature there quoted.
The bias appears because when agents play feedback strategies they can
immediately react to any deviation or change in emissions of the other agents
as long as emissions depend on accumulated emissions and the dynamics
of this variable is determined by emissions of all agents. With feedback
strategies the strategic interdependence among the agents is stressed and the
32e¢ciency losses of the noncooperative outcome increase with respect to the
open-loop Nash equilibrium. The intuition, using de Zeeuw’s words, is as
follows: “Each country knows that in a feedback information structure the
other countries observe the stock of pollutants and react to higher stocks
with lower output and pollution. Therefore, each country knows that an
increase in output and pollution will then be partly o¤set by a decrease in all
the other countries. This implies that the feedback equilibrium will lead to
higher levels of pollution than the open-loop equilibrium, where the countries
do not observe the stock of pollutants” (de Zeeuw (1998, p. 251)).
Finally, we would want to point out that the di¤erence between the coop-
erative and the noncooperative outcome decreases with respect to b=c.I fw e









N(N ¡ 1)[± + k ¡ N (®i=b)]
(k(± + k)(b=c)+N2)(± + k ¡ (N ¡ 1)(®i=b))
: (50)





















It is easy to show that the derivative of (50) with respect to b=c is positive,
see Appendix D. This result establishes that an increase of the environmen-
tal damages results in an increase of the ine¢ciency of the noncooperative
solution.









N (N ¡ 1)(®i=b)
(k(± + k)(b=c)+N)(± + k ¡ (N ¡ 1)(®i=b))
(51)
also decreases in absolute values with respect to b=c. This means that the
open-loop Nash equilibrium is not an accurate approximation of the feedback
Nash equilibrium if the environmental damages are high enough.
335 STABILITY OF AN IEA IN THE DYNAMIC
MODEL
The stability of an IEA in a dynamic model can be analyzed using a di¤er-
ential game among n signatory countries and N ¡n nonsignatory countries.
In this section we calculate the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the feed-
back Nash equilibrium of the game and we look for the stable coalition in a
dynamic framework.
5.1 Open-loop Nash equilibrium
We assume that each nonsignatory country chooses the level of emissions that
maximizes the present value of the stream of net bene…ts given the emissions




















Signatory countries also take the emissions of nonsignatories as given and




























qj ¡ kz; z(0) = z0 ¸ 0: (54)
As in the previous section, an equilibrium of the game are N open-loop
strategies that solve the N optimization problems simultaneously. De…ning
the current value of the Hamiltonian in the standard way, we obtain the
following set of necessary conditions for an interior open-loop equilibrium
a ¡ bqi + ¸i =0 , i =1 ;:::;n ; (55)
34:
¸i =( ± + k)¸i + ncz, i =1 ;:::;n; (56)
a ¡ bqj + ¸j =0 , j =1 ;:::;N ¡ n; (57)
:
¸j =( ± + k)¸j + cz, j =1 ;:::;N¡ n (58)




¡±t¸i ¸ 0; lim
t!1
e




¡±t¸j ¸ 0; lim
t!1
e
¡±t¸jz =0 : (60)
Each kind of country faces a di¤erent marginal user cost. For nonsignato-
ries, ¸j is the private marginal user cost, whereas for signatories, ¸i represents
the marginal user cost for the countries that participate in the IEA (n · N).
Obviously, for n = N, (55) and (56) are identical to the necessary conditions
of the cooperative solution, and for n =0 , (57) and (58) are identical to the
necessary conditions of the noncooperative solution.
Under the symmetry assumption the 2N equations de…ned by (55)¡(58)
reduce to 4. Then, using (55) and (57) to eliminate the marginal user cost
from (56) and (58), we obtain the following system of di¤erential equations
for emissions
:















that together with the dynamic constraint of accumulated emissions allows







z =0yields the steady-state values of the




a[k(± + k)b ¡ (N ¡ n)(n ¡ 1)c]





a[k(± + k)b + n(n ¡ 1)c]





N (± + k)a
k (± + k)b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c
: (63)
It is easy to see from (63) that the steady-state accumulated emissions
decrease as the number of countries that sign the agreement increases. It is
also easy to prove that the steady state emissions of nonsignatory countries





Nac2 (2n ¡ 1)
b[k (± + k)b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c]
2 > 0:
However, the steady-state emissions of signatory countries can increase or
decrease, although the aggregate state emissions always decrease with respect
to the number of countries belonging to the agreement.
Furthermore, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the system of
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= ¡(± + k)
·
n(± + k)+




16A necessary and su¢cient condition for positive steady-state emissions of signatories
for all n in the interval [2;N ¡ 1] is (b=c) > (N ¡ 1)2=4k(± + k): From (61) we obtain
that qol
i1 > 0 implies that (b=c) > (N ¡ n)(n ¡ 1)=k(± + k); where (N ¡ n)(n ¡ 1) is a
concave function with respect to n which reaches a maximum for n =( N +1 ) =2 equal to
(N ¡ 1)2=4: By substitution of this maximum in the previous inequality we get the lower
bound for b=c which guarantees that steady-state emissions of signatories are positive for
all n:
36This implies that the steady-state of the system is a saddle point and that
there exists an optimal path which leads to it. The optimal paths for the






































b [k (± + k)b +( N + n2 ¡ n)c]
i
< 0:
Thus, the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game has the same features
that the solution for the di¤erential game studied in the previous section.
For this reason, we omit to summarize them (see Proposition 7).
Next, we show that:
Proposition 11 T h ed i s c o u n t e dp r e s e n tv a l u eo fn o n s i g n a t o r i e si sh i g h e r
than the discounted present value of signatories: W ol
j (n) >W ol
i (n):
Proof. First, we compare the temporal paths of emissions given by (64)
and (65)beginning with the initial values
q
ol
i (0) ¡ q
ol
j (0) = ¡(n ¡ 1)
·
Nca
b[(N + n2 ¡ n)c + k (± + k)b]
+
c






The …rst term between square brackets can be written, using (63),a s
follows
Nca










i (0) ¡ q
ol
j (0) = ¡
(n ¡ 1)cr





i =dt = n(dqol
j =dt) < 0; we can conclude that the emissions
of nonsignatory countries are higher than the emissions of signatories for all
t 2 [0;1), which implies, as can be easily checked from (61) and (62),t h a t
qol
i1 <q ol
j1. Another implication of this conclusion is that nonsignatories
obtain a higher payo¤ than signatories. Notice that both types of countries
face the same costs as long as z is a public bad and there is symmetry in the
bene…t and cost functions.¤
However, in order to study the stability of the coalition we need to com-
pare Wol
i (n) and W ol
j (n ¡ 1). Substituting the optimal control paths of
emissions and pollution stock, given by (64), (65) and (66) into (52) and (53)
and integrating, we obtain the discounted present value of net bene…ts for
















cn2 ¡ b(r ¡ ± ¡ k)(± + k)
(r ¡ ±)(± + k)
+
cn2 + b(r ¡ ± ¡ k)
2


















c ¡ b(r ¡ ± ¡ k)(± + k)
(r ¡ ±)(± + k)
+
c + b(r ¡ ± ¡ k)
2
2(2r ¡ ±)(r ¡ ± ¡ k)
:
5.2 A numerical example
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare analytically W ol
i (n) and W ol
j (n ¡ 1).
However, a numerical example shows that the discounted value of net bene…ts
increases with respect to n for both signatory and nonsignatory countries,
38and that only a bilateral coalition can be stable as long as W ol
i (2) >W ol
j (1)
and W ol
j (n ¡ 1) >W ol
i (n) for any size of coalition higher than two,17 see
Table 2.
Table 2: Stability analysis for the numerical example. Open-loop
strategies*
n    ∞ i q    ∞ j q   ∞ z     i W     j W    W
1 26.087 52173.913 42494805 424948050
2 23.687 26.129 51282.051 42535812 42673667 426460960
3 21.488 26.210 49586.777 42662880 43020919 429135073
4 19.573 26.322 47244.094 42871247 43516977 432586850
5 17.989 26.455 44444.444 43153388 44135677 436445325
6 16.749 26.601 41379.310 43499700 44847225 440387100
7 15.833 26.752 38216.561 43899272 45621198 444158498
8 15.205 26.901 35087.719 44340702 46429025 447583666
9 14.821 27.044 32085.561 44812801 47245665 450560874
10 14.634 29268.293 45305098 453050980
*Assumes k=0.005, N=10, a=100000, b=3500, c=0.005 and  025 . 0 = δ
Finally, in order to address the scope of this result we develop a sensitivity
analysis considering di¤erent values for the parameters of the model. Table
3p r e s e n t st h ev a l u e sc h o s e n .
17In order to avoid a negative discounted present value of the ‡ow of net bene…ts we have
had to increase substantially the ratio b=c with respect to the static model. We have not
used these new values for the static model because in that case the numerical di¤erences
between the Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria are imperceptible.
39Table 3: Parameter values for the sensitivity analysis and
reductions in steady-state accumulated emissions (%). Open-loop
strategies.*
c b



















































* Assumes k=0.005, N=10 and a=100000. The top number in each cell repre-
s e n t st h eg a i n so fc o o p e r a t i o nf o r± =0 :025and the bottom for ± =0 :05
In the cells of Table 3 we write the percentage reductions in steady-state
accumulated emissions given by (35) for two di¤erent discount rates. These
variations gives us an idea of the potential gains coming from cooperation in
terms of the reductions in the steady-state accumulated emissions that could
be achieved in the case of a full-cooperation. The maximum gains of full
cooperation are obtained when c =0 :01, b =1 5 0 0and the rate of discount is
equal to 0.025. This upper bound appears because we impose the following







18Notice that according to (35) the reductions in the steady-state accumulated emissions
are inversely related with b=c:
40which guarantees that qol
i1 is positive for all n; see Footnote (16).19 From
this case we consider lower values for c and higher values for b until reaching
a potential gains of around 10% for ± =0 :025 assuming that the issue of
cooperation fails to be attractive below this value. This is the logic of Table
3 and the example. In this way, we think that the considered range of values
for the parameters covers all the relevant situations for the study of the
stability of the agreement. Our calculations yield the same result for the
…fty cases studied: only a bilateral IEA is self-enforcing independently of the
gains coming from cooperation. The similarity between the results obtained
in the static model and the ones obtained in the dynamic model should not
surprise us because when the open-loop Nash equilibrium concept is used
to solve the di¤erential game, this becomes essentially a one-shot game as
long as the players commit themselves at the moment of starting to an entire
temporal path of emissions. The nature of the game, therefore, does not
change substantially and for this reason we ought not to expect qualitative
di¤erences in our conclusions.
5.3 Feedback Nash equilibrium
As in subsection 4.3 we assume that agents play linear strategies that satisfy
the principle of optimality of dynamic programming. The Bellman’s equation
for nonsignatories is
























and the optimal value of the control variable must satisfy the necessary con-
dition
a ¡ bqj + W
0
j =0 ;j=1 ;:::;N ¡ n: (69)
19In fact, the maximum reduction in steady-state accumulated emissions is something
higher: 74.84% for ± =0 :025 if we assume that qol
i1 is zero, that happens for b=c = 135000
according to the values of N and k that appear in Table 2. Instead of this, we have
assumed a strictly positive value for qol
i1 with b=c = 150000: Then we have chosen an
arbitrary value for c equal to 0.01 which yields b =1 5 0 0 :
41To calculate the linear strategies for signatories we use the following Bell-
man’s equation





























where Wn stands for the value function of the coalition. From this equation
we obtain the following necessary condition
a ¡ bqi + W
0
n =0 ;i=1 ;:::;n: (71)
Substituting qi =( a + W 0
n)=b and qj =
¡
a + W 0
j
¢
=b in (70) and rearrang-


























































In order to derive the solution to the di¤erential equation system (72)










2 + ¯jz + ¹j. (74)
Using (74) to eliminate Wn, W 0
n, Wj and W 0
j from Eqs. (72) and (73) and












®n ¡ nbc =0(75)
Na®n +( N ¡ n)®n¯j +[ n®n +( N ¡ n)®j ¡ b(k + ±)]¯n =0(76)
n(a + ¯n)




¯n ¡ 2b±¹n =0(77)










®j ¡ bc =0(78)




a +( 2( N ¡ n) ¡ 1)¯j
¤
+2 n(a + ¯n)¯j ¡ 2b±¹j =0(80)
This system does not have an analytical solution. For this reason, we
use the same numerical example that the one used for the open-loop Nash
equilibrium to calculate the solution.20 Eqs.(75) and (78) have two pairs of
real solutions for ®n and ®j. A pair of positive values and another pair of
negative values but only the negative values satisfy the stability condition.
To obtain this condition we substitute the linear strategies in the dynamic




























N e x t ,u s i n gt h en e g a t i v ev a l u e sf o r®n and ®j we calculate ¯n and ¯j from
(76) and (79) and then ¹n and ¹j from (77) and (80).
Given these values, if we assume that z0 =0 ,w eh a v et h a tW
f
i = Wn=n =
¹n=n and W
f
j = ¹j, so that we are able to write the value functions in terms
of n and analyze the stability of coalitions for the feedback Nash equilibrium.
20We have computed the solution using the MAPLE program.
435.4 A numerical example
Our results show, as happened for the open-loop Nash equilibrium, that only




j (1) and W
f
j (n ¡ 1) >
W
f
i (n) for any size of coalition higher than two. See Table 4.
Table 4: Stability analysis for the numerical example. Feedback
strategies.*
n    ∞ i q    ∞ j q   ∞ z    i W    j W   W
1 26.114 52227.699 42482548 424825480
2 23.732 26.161 51351.010 42522777 42657598 426306338
3 21.540 26.252 49676.318 42647897 42999455 428939876
4 19.622 26.377 47350.254 42854182 43490779 432361402
5 18.030 26.527 44556.940 43135027 44107150 436210885
6 16.777 26.691 41485.569 43481491 44819793 440168118
7 15.850 26.859 38305.125 43883036 45598495 443976737
8 15.213 27.025 35150.249 44328318 46414217 447454978
9 14.823 27.183 32117.445 44805945 47241061 450494566
10 14.634 29268.293 45305098 453050980
*Assumes k=0.005, N=10, a=100000, b=3500, c=0.005 and  025 . 0 = δ
Again the analysis of sensitivity shows that only a bilateral IEA is self-
enforcing independently of the gains coming from cooperation for the …fty
cases studied.21
21Complete computation of the numerical examples studied in this paper is available
upon request.
44Table 5: Parameter values for the sensitivity analysis and
reductions in steady-state accumulated emissions (%). Feedback
strategies.*
C b



















































* Assumes k=0.005, N=10 and a=100000. The top number in each cell repre-
s e n t st h eg a i n so fc o o p e r a t i o nf o r± =0 :025and the bottom for ± =0 :05
The unique di¤erence we …nd with the previous example is that now
the percentage gains of cooperation are something greater than when the
countries used open-loop strategies. Compare Table 5 with Table 3. This is
a consequence of the fact that the noncooperative outcome is less e¢cient
for the feedback Nash equilibrium in linear strategies than for the open-loop
Nash equilibrium.22
The intuition of this result is that agents do not …nd it pro…table to select
punishment strategies as long as they are vulnerable, using the terminology
of repeated games theory, to renegotiation. In other words, punishment
22In our example these di¤erences are minimal. This is explained because we impose a
lower bound for b=c, see (67), in order to guarantee that qol
i1 is positive for all n.A s a
consequence of this we are implicitly de…ning an upper bound on (51), i.e., an upper bound
on the distance, in relative terms, between the steady-state accumulated emissions of the
open-loop Nash equilibrium and the steady-state accumulated emissions of the feedback
Nash equilibrium that in our example is very small. The result is that for this case the
open-loop Nash equilibrium is a good approximation of the feedback Nash equilibrium.
45strategies are not credible because they have a negative e¤ect on the own
payo¤s higher than the negative e¤ect of accommodating to the exit of one
of the countries in the agreement. Thus, if we compute the optimal strategies
for our example we …nd that the optimal reaction of a signatory country to
an increase of accumulated emissions caused, for instance, by the exit of one
country in the agreement, is to reduce emissions and accommodate the exit.
I nt h ee x a m p l eo fT a b l e4 ,f o rt h es i g n a t o r i e s@qi=@z goes from - 3.692148(10)4
for n =1 0to - 7.981728(10)¡5 for n =2 : Then, given that the incentive to
act as a free rider is su¢ciently large and that the countries in the agreement
accommodate the exit, the result is that only a bilateral agreement can be
self-enforcing. This minimal level of cooperation appears because the payo¤s
of the signatories increase with respect to the number of countries belonging
to the agreement so that if there are only two countries in the agreement and
one of them withdraws from the coalition its payo¤s decrease.
A …nal comment on the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. For this kind
of di¤erential game there is no di¤erence between the Nash equilibrium and
the Stackleberg equilibrium. The explanation is very simple. If we look at
the necessary conditions (69) and (71); which we can interpret as dynamic
reaction functions, we see that the unique interdependence among the coun-
tries is through the state variable. In other words, the emissions of country
i do not depend directly on the emissions of country j so that if we substi-
tute the reaction function of the nonsignatories in the Bellman’s equation of
signatories, we obtain the same necessary condition for signatories and the
system of di¤erential equations (72) and (73) is also the same.
6C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S
This paper has focused on the analysis of stability of voluntary environmental
agreements both in a static and in a dynamic framework. Coalition formation
has been designed as a noncooperative game where some countries cooperate
and sign an agreement and the others do not cooperate. The results show
that cooperation improves welfare so that the payo¤s of signatory countries
monotonically increase as the size of the coalition increases and it is also
the case for nonsignatories. However the incentive for a country to act as
a free rider is big enough as if to prevent cooperation once a coalition of
two countries has been reached. This result is independent of the concept
of equilibrium used to solve the game and the framework, static (‡ow exter-
46nality) or dynamic (stock externality), taken into account. For the dynamic
model the explanation of this result is that countries do not …nd it pro…table
to select punishment strategies because they have a negative e¤ect on their
own payo¤s higher than the negative e¤ect of accommodating to the exit of
one country in the agreement. Then, given that there exists an incentive to
act as a free rider, the countries defect from the agreement until this is only
constituted by two countries. For two countries this incentive disappears be-
cause the two countries lose if they leave the agreement since the payo¤s of
signatories always increase with respect to the number of countries belonging
to the agreement.
As regards the e¤ect of the asymmetry on the scope of the agreement
we guess that the result is not going to change very much. The intuition is
the following. Suppose that there are two types of countries: small and big.
Obviously, big countries could punish small countries without a¤ecting very
much their own payo¤s but this is not the case if a big country decides to
withdraw. Then, if the incentive for a big country to act as a free rider is
high enough the country abandons the agreement. On the other hand, an
agreement constituted only by small countries is not stable either because
again the punishment strategies are not credible. For this reason we expect
that the scope of the agreement, even under asymmetry, be limited.23
Other issues for future research are the following. A …rst task could be
to consider that there exists imperfect information on bene…ts and cost func-
tions or uncertainty on environmental damages.24 Moreover, since emissions,
in many cases, are very di¢cult to monitor, another extension could be the
analysis of the pro…tability and stability of an IEA when the instrument of
the environmental policy is a tax on emissions.
23This intuition is supported by the results obtained by Hoel (1992) for a model with
heterogeneous countries and constant marginal environmental cost. See the Introduction.
24In this line Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996) have addressed the problem of designing a
mechanism to enforce an IEA under moral hazard, and Na and Shin (1998) have analyzed
a game of coalition formation among three countries that are not identical when there
is uncertainty concerning the distribution of the bene…ts of pollution abatement activity,
and the marginal bene…ts are linear. Another interesting paper is Batabyal (2000). This
author focuses on the problem of designing contracts among a supra-national governmental
authority and the government and a representative polluting …rm of a developing country
when there is uncertainty on the pollution abatement technology.
47A Behavior of emissions with regard to the
size of the coalition in the leadership model.
(i) Firstly, we show that emissions of signatories countries decrease with
the number of countries that sign the agreement. First, notice that in the
numerator of (15),
£
n2 (b + c)c ¡ (b + Nc)
2¤
is an increasing function that
equals to zero for n¤ =( b + Nc)=((b + c)c)
1=2 : Suppose now that n¤ ·
N: This implies that b + Nc · Nc1=2 (b + c)
1=2 : Squaring this expression,
simplifying and rearranging terms we get b=c < N(N ¡ 2), what contradicts
the condition established in the Section 2.1 to guarantee positive net bene…ts
for the noncooperative Cournot equilibrium. Therefore, we must conclude
that n¤ >Nand, as a result, that
£
n2 (b + c)c ¡ (b + Nc)
2¤
is negative
so that emissions by signatory countries are decreasing with the number of
countries that sign the agreement.
(ii) Secondly, we show that emissions of nonsignatories increase with the
number of countries that sign the agreement. In the numerator of (16), £
n2 (b + c)c ¡ 2n(b + Nc)(b + c)+( b + Nc)
2¤
is a convex function of n that




















so that the function takes negative values for n 2 (n;n): Suppose now that













































1=2 (b +( N ¡ 1)c) ¸ (b + Nc)b
1=2;
and squaring this expression we get
(N ¡ 1)
2 c
2 ¸ (b + c)b: (81)
O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,w eh a v ea s s u m e di nS e c t i o n2 . 1t h a tb ¸ N(N ¡ 2)c.
Multiplying this inequality by b+c we have that (b + c)b ¸ (N¡2)Nc(b + c)
that in combination with (81) imposes the following condition on b : c=(N ¡
2)N>b ;which is not compatible with the previous condition on b since
both conditions imply that 1 > (N ¡ 2)2N2; which is not true for N ¸ 3:
Therefore, we can conclude that the function of n in the denominator of (16)
takes negative values for n 2 (n;n),w i t h0 · n · 1 <N<n; so that for
n 2 [2;N]; emissions by nonsignatory countries increase with the size of the
coalition.
B Discounted present value for the coopera-
tive solution








































































N (a ¡ bq¤
i1)
b(r¤ ¡ ± ¡ k)
¡ z
¤
1,a n dJ =1+
N2c




































cN2 ¡ b(r¤ ¡ ± ¡ k)(± + k)
b(r¤ ¡ ± ¡ k)(± + k)
¶
;
















cN2 ¡ b(r¤ ¡ ± ¡ k)(± + k)
(r¤ ¡ ±)(± + k)
+
cN2 + b(r¤ ¡ ± ¡ k)
2
2(2r¤ ¡ ±)(r¤ ¡ ± ¡ k)
:
50C Comparison of the two noncooperative
solutions
First, we compare the steady-state values for accumulated emissions. Using
(31) and (47), we …nd that the di¤erence between the two steady-state values

















+( N ¡ 1)c®i
ª
b[k((± + k)b ¡ (N ¡ 1)®i)+Nc][k (± + k)b + Nc]
;
where the denominator is positive as long as ®i is negative. Then, taking






®i¡bc =0 , according to (39),w eo b t a i n
a negative di¤erence for the numerator and we can conclude that zol
1 is lower
than zf
1: To compare the steady-state emissions we take into consideration
















which has a negative sign.
Now, in order to compare the optimal paths we de…ne rf as ¡k+(N®i)=b
and we compare it with the negative root of the open-loop Nash equilibrium,

































[k(± + k)b + Nc]:































and we can conclude that
¯ ¯rf¯ ¯ <


































¯. The rest of the proof follows the proof of Proposition 8
step by step. For this reason, this part has been omitted.
D Percentage variation of steady-state accu-
mulated emissions








= ¡N(N ¡ 1)F;
where
F =
(± + k ¡ N(®i=b))
(k(± + k)(b=c)+N2)(± + k ¡ (N ¡ 1)(®i=b))
:
The derivative of the numerator is ¡N
@(®i=b)










The derivative of the denominator is k (± + k)(± + k ¡ (N ¡ 1)(®i=b)) ¡
(k(± +k)(b=c)+N2)((N ¡1)=2(b=c)2)G¡1=2 whose sign is ambiguous. Using





2)(± + k ¡ (N ¡ 1)(®i=b))











+k(± + k ¡ N(®i=b))(± + k ¡ (N ¡ 1)(®i=b))];
so that @F=@(b=c) is negative and consequently @¢z=@(b=c) is positive.
25Remember that ®i=b is negative.
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